The root of the Challenger disaster on January 28, 1986, reads like a textbook case of engineering warnings crushed by schedule pressure. Morton Thiokol engineers — most publicly Roger Boisjoly — had for months been arguing that the shuttle's solid rocket motor joint relied on rubber O‑ring seals that were vulnerable at low temperatures. By the morning of the launch, ambient temperatures at Cape Canaveral were far below anything previously experienced on a shuttle flight. Boisjoly and other Thiokol engineers recommended delaying the launch; in a now‑infamous prelaunch teleconference they initially advised against a launch in the cold. Under pressure from Thiokol management after discussions with NASA, that recommendation was reversed and flight was approved. Seventy‑three seconds after liftoff the right solid rocket booster O‑ring failed, leading to structural breakup and the deaths of all seven aboard — Commander Dick Scobee, Pilot Michael Smith, Christa McAuliffe, Ronald McNair, Judith Resnik, Ellison Onizuka, and Gregory Jarvis.
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